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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. POWERS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. 
MARVIN S. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
EMMA STILLMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARVIN S. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9694 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondents brought separate actions in the Lower 
Court to enjoin the appellant from allowing his horses 
to trespass and roam at will upon their residential yards 
in the mouth of Mill Creek, Salt Lake County and for 
damages to their property caused by the horses .. Respon-
dent Powers also sought punitive damages from the 
appellant. The Lower Court consolidated the cases for 
trial. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO,YER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury, 
the Honorable l\Ierrill C. Faux presiding. The jury 
found in favor of the respondents and against the 
appellant and granted judg1nent thereon. Respondent 
Stillman was awarded $350.00, actual datnages, and 
Respondent Powers was awarded $1,000.00, actual dam-
ages, and $2,500.00, punitive damages. Powers con-
sented to a remittitur of punitive damages in the sum 
of $1,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Powers and the appellant are neigh-
bors in a residential area. They live next door to each 
other (Tr. 6). Respondent Stillman and the appellant 
are also neighbors, Mrs. Stillman living directly across 
the street from the Respondent Powers (Tr. 7). In the 
year 1954, the appellant began having difficulties with 
Respondent Powers in regard to Taylor's horse grazing 
on this respondent's property ( Tr. 61). Powers is an 
elderly gentleman past 70 years of age (Tr. 53), the 
defendant being in his middle forties. ( Tr. 5 and 6.) 
The appellant struck Powers and threatened bodily 
injury to him over a dispute about the horse coming 
onto Powers' property (Tr. 12, 15, 22, 64, 65). From 
the year 1954 to the time the actions were filed, Taylor's 
horses were frequently running loose on the properties 
of both respondents ( Tr. 65, 66 and 98). 
Since 1954 there have been as high as ten (10} 
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horses stabled on the appellant's property during the 
years of trespass (Tr. 9, 60). From the year 1954 until 
the time of trial, the appellant's horses have continually 
been allowed to wander off the property of the appellant 
and onto the lawns and flower beds of both .respondents 
(Tr. 65, 66 and 98). Although the respondents made 
repeated demands upon the appellant to restrain his 
horses to prevent further damage to their lawns, shrub-
bery and flowers, their requests fell on deaf ears. During 
the years of 1958, 1959 and 1960, the appellant's horses 
made numerous trips to the respondents' property and 
while there grazed and trampled upon the lush foliage 
and flowers, and in the process of doing so, severely 
damaged their flower beds, evergreens, flowering trees, 
and lawns of both respondents (Tr. 33, 44 to 51, 70, 
99 to 104, 127) . 
When Mrs. Stillman requested the appellant to 
please restrain his horses, he responded by saying, "If 
you don't want my animals on your place, put up a 
fence." (Tr. 98.) To further antagonize the Respondent 
Powers, appellant permitted and actually instructed his 
young son to fire a rifle across and into Powers' pre-
mises after having been requested not to do so. To 
further demonstrate Taylor's utter disregard for the 
rights of the respondents and his malicious frame of 
mind, he threatened to beat Powers until he could not 
walk if he ever found him out on the street (Tr. 74 
and 75). 
Both respondents produced ample evidence of 
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malice and damage to their property upon which the 
jury based its verdict. 
POINTS URGED FOR A:FFIRMANCE 
POINT NO. I 
THF.( COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
MITTING RESPONDENT PO,iVERS TO 
PRESENT EY.IDENCE OF THE APPEL-
LANT'S MALICE AND WANTON MISCON-
DUCT PRIOR TO THE YEARS OF 1958, 
1959 AND 1960. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY ON DAMAGES "\VAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL TO THE APPELLANT AND THERE 
IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT 
A DIFFERENT RESULT WOULD HAVE 
OCCURRED lJNDER OTHER INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY THAT IT COULD 
FIND PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAM-
AGES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
TI-IE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
l\IITTING RESPONDENT POWERS TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE APPEL-
LANT'S lYIALICE AND WANTON MISCON-
DUCT PRIOR TO THE YEARS OF 1958, 
1959 AND 1960. 
The testimony of Mr. Powers as well as the testi-
mony of his wife and other neighbors in the immediate 
area clearly demonstrates the malicious and uncoopera-
tive attitude of Taylor ( Tr. 152). The record is clear 
that the evidence concerning Taylor's malice and utter 
disregard for the rights of both respondents occurred 
prior to the years in question and continued up to the 
time of suit. The evidence offered by counsel for the 
respondents was to show the state of mind of the appel-
lant as well as for the purpose of impeachment inasmuch 
as Taylor flatly denied ever having struck Powers or 
ever having been charged with and convicted of this 
assault and battery. The Court fully instructed the jury 
that they were not to consider the testimony as having 
any bearing on damages prior to the years in dispute. 
The antagonistic attitude of Taylor commenced prior 
to 1954 and continued to the time of trial. This is amply 
demonstrated by the evidence produced by the respon-
dents and was clearly admissible to show a malicious 
state of mind on the part of the appellant. See 20 Am. 
Jur., Evidence, P. 322, Sec. 346, wherein it is stated: 
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"'Vhere Inalice is an essential factor in a case 
and is not to be presu1ned from the doing of the 
act charged, the courts adhere to a liberal view 
in permitting a relatiYely wide range of eYidence 
which tends to show the state of Inind and to 
show or rebut n1alice. Proof of previous ill-will 
or feeling of personal hostility is often allowed 
as proof of the existence of malice at a particular 
t . " nne. 
The author then states in Section 347: 
"Threats made after an assault against the 
person are admissible upon the question of mal-
ice." 
Evidence of malice and ill-will on the part of the 
appellant being an essential element of proof in the 
Powers case, it was clearly admissible and proper for 
the trial Court to allow such evidence to show a pattern 
of conduct carried on by the appellant. See 20 Am. Jur., 
Evidence, P. 281, Sec. 303, wherein the author states: 
"The law in civil cases, as well as in criminal 
cases permits proof of acts other than the one 
charged which are so related in character, time, 
and place of commission as to tend to support 
the conclusion that they were part of a plan or 
system or as to tend to show the existence of 
such a plan or system. Thus, when one's motive, 
malice, or ill-will or his intention or good or bad 
faith in doing or omitting to do certain acts 
becomes an issue, his acts, statements, and con-
duct on other occasions which have a bearing 
upon his motive or intention upon the occasion 
in question are competent evidence." 
The evidence demonstrated that Taylor had bullied 
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and threatened Powers, an elderly man, with bodily 
injury because he had objected to Taylor's horses invad-
ing his property and severely damaging his lawn and 
gardens. 
Ill-will is also indicated by his attitude toward 
Respondent Stillman, his aunt, wherein he told her in 
so many words that if she did not desire his horses roam-
ing and trampling upon her property and eating her 
flowers, she could build her own fence to keep them 
out. The evidence of his actions from the time he obtained 
his horses up to the time of suit, and the continuing 
conflict, shows his utter disregard for his neighbors' 
property. This evidence was properly admitted to sho'v 
malice or ill-will. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY ON DAMAGES WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL TO THE APPELLANT AND THERE 
IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT 
A DIFFERENT RESULT WOULD HAVE 
OCCURRED UNDER OTHER INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
The appellant complains of the instruction given 
by the Court concerning the actual damages. It should 
be noted that at no time did counsel for the appellant 
request an instruction to be given by the Court on this 
point. In fact, appellant requested no instructions what-
soever. The awards made by the jury clearly demon-
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strate that they were not confused or Inisled hy the 
Court's instructions. 1-Iad the jury awarded dmnnges 
to either of the respondents in excess of the evidence 
concerning the difference in value of the homes before 
and after the damage, it perhaps could be argued that 
they were n1isled by the Court's instruction. The awards 
made to the respondents for the actual damage to their 
yards and shrubbery were considerably less than the 
evidence would have supported. 
Appellant states at Page 4 of his Brief that, "It 
would be a fair statement to say that the only datnage 
sustained by the respondents, or either of them, was 
damage to the plants, none of which were destroyed ... " 
l-Ie admits that there was damage. He then states again 
at Page 4, "Apparently, all the plants complained of 
were annuals, and most of the trespasses occurred during 
the season of the year when these plants . were neither 
blooming nor growing." The record is clear that the 
trespasses commenced in the spring and continued until 
fall. The record also shows that aside from annual 
plants, there were many evergreens, rose bushes, and 
flowering shrubs as well as the lawns of both respondents 
that were damaged or destroyed. It would have been 
useless for respondents to have replaced shrubs and 
repaired their lawns and flower beds while the horses 
were not being restrained. 
Nowhere in Point II of appellant's brief does he 
complain that the amount of actual damage awarded 
to either respondent was excessive. Neither has the 
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appellant maintained that had the Court given the in-
struction as outlined in his brief, the actual damages 
awarded by the jury would have been less. In all prob-
ability, they would have been the same or perhaps even 
more. This Court has clearly recognized the almost 
impossible task of conducting a jury trial without the 
possibility of some error creeping into the record. The 
fact that there may have been error conunitted standing 
alone is insufficient to justify the over-turning of a jury 
verdict. As was stated in the case of Hales v. Peterson_, 
11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822, at Page 415, 
"We have heretofore recognized the import-
ance of safeguarding the right of trial by jury. 
A necessary corollary to it is that there must be 
some solidarity in the result so that it can be 
relied upon. To the extent the verdict can easily 
be set aside by the court, the right to trial by 
jury is weakened. In order to give substance to 
the right, once the trial has been had and a ver-
dict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly, 
nor over-turned because of errors or irregularities 
unless they are of sufficient consequence to have 
affected the result. 
"Anyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion of a trial by jury and the human factors 
that must be a part therein is aware that it would 
be almost impossible to complete a trial of any 
length without some things occurring with which 
counsel, after the case is lost, can find fault 
and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good faith, 
magnify into error which to him and the losing 
parties seem blamable for their failure to prevail. 
However, from the standpoint of administering 
even-handed justice, the court must dispassion-
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ately survey such claims against the over-all pic-
ture of the trial, and if the parties have been 
afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly pre-
sent their evidence and arguments upon the 
issues, and the jury has made its determination 
thereon, the objective of the proceeding has been 
accomplished. And the judgment should not be 
disturbed unless it is shown that there is error 
which is substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
that it appears that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the result would have been different 
in the absence of such error . .. ,., (Italics ours.) 
Appellant does not, and cannot reasonably main-
tain that the actual damages sustained by the respon-
dents and the jury's award thereon would have been in 
a lesser amount had the Court given the instruction he 
suggests in his brief, but which he, at no time, requested. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY THAT IT COULD 
FIND PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAM-
AGES. 
The evidence presented by Respondent Powers as 
to being struck by the appellant at an earlier time as 
well as threats that were made to him clearly demon-
strates that there was a malicious, utter disregard by the 
appellant for this respondent's rights. For a man in his 
middle forties to strike and then later on threaten bodily 
harm to another in his seventies can only reflect but 
one state of mind, that of ill-will and malice. Repeated 
10 
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requests by both respondents that Taylor please keep 
his horses on his own property brought nothing but 
threats and insults from him. 
The testimony of neighbors, not parties to this 
action, was to the effect that Taylor had a reputation 
of being hard to get along with in the community and 
was totally uncooperative when it came to restraining 
his horses from damaging his neighbors' property (Tr. 
121, 124, 125, 143, 152). 
The evidence clearly demonstrated to the jury and 
the trial Court that Taylor was an inconsiderate, hot-
tempered bully in the treatment of those around hin1 
and made no effort whatsoever to respect their rights 
(Tr. 197). 
Appellant's Brief includes an annotation cited at 
28 A.L.R. 2d, Page 1076, considering the element of 
damages for shock and mental strain. Respondent 
Powers will not further burden this Court with a dis-
cussion of the law cited therein as the annotation clearly 
deals with compensory damages and not with exemplary 
or punitive damages. It is in no way applicable to the 
instant case. 
The jury in the instant case awarded punitive dam-
ages to Powers, not as compensation for mental suffer-
ing, but as punishment to the appellant and as a warn-
ing to him to mend his ways. Respondent Powers 
respectfully submits that the abuse and ill-will shown 
him by Taylor clearly justifies the jury's award of puni-
11 
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tive damages. See 15 Am. Jur. Damages, P. 710, Sec. 
274. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by both respondents 
that the issues of fact and reasonable inferences there-
from should be construed in their favor by this Court. 
Appellant has not asked for any affirmative relief in 
his Brief nor can he demonstrate where the damages 
awarded are excessive or that the awards would have 
been different had the Court given the instruction he 
suggested in his Brief, although he did not request the 
same at the time of trial. The jury's findings and awards 
should be affirmed as a lesson to the appellant for his 
inexcusable conduct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Milton A. Oman 
Attorney f:or Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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